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Peters: Some Statutory Modifications of the Hearsay Rule
LEGISLATION
results is desirable. The forms of modification are several: 1. The
replacement of county jails by centralized district institutions;
2. by a permissive statute granting discretion to committing
magistrates or county commissioners. The first proposal will appeal to those who see the coordination of governmental functions
and the reduction of governmental units as the only fundamental
step to the reduction of governmental costs. To those unwilling
to make so extensive and initially expensive change the removal
of the mandatory provision of the present law would accomplish
the reduction in costs that taxpayers demand. West Virginia
can draft a satisfactory plan from the experience of other
states.
-CHARLES H. HADEN.

SOME STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS OF THE
HEARSAY RULE
The persistent strictness of the law of evidence has been relaxed in West Virginia in regard to certain exceptions to the
hearsay rule. The business entries doctrine is illustrative.' According to the generally accepted view, a business entry is admissible when, among other things, the entrant is unavailable;
but the orthodox view only recognizes, as forms of unavailability,
death,2 insanity,' and absence from the jurisdiction.' West Virginia has added to this list, commercial unavailibility, that is,
the entry is admissible where the commercial inconvenience in
calling the witness outweighs its utility. In this instance West
Virginia has brought the law into accord with business practice
without the aid of statutory enactment.
"For a general discussion of the business entries doctrine see 2 WIGMORE,
(2d ed. 1923) § 1517 ff.
2 The general principles of admissibility of business entries were first laid
down in this state in Vinal v. Gilman, 21 W. Va. 301, 309 (1883).
See
also Deitz v. MeVey, 77 W. Va. 601, 87 S. E. 926 (1916) and DiBacco v.
Benedetto, 82 W. Va. 84, 95 S. E. 601 (1918).
8 Vinal v. Gilman, supra n. 2.
'Vinal v. Gilman, supra n. 2, at 310; Bourn v. Dobbins, 92 W. Va. 263,
269, 115 S. E. 424 (1922); State v. Martin, 102 W. Va. 107, 134 S. E. 599
(1926) (Holding the entries admissible without producing the entrants, when
their whereabouts were unknown). For comments see (1927) 33 W. VA. L.
9. 305, (1927) 25 McH. L. REv. 305.
5W. Va. Architects and Builders v. Stewart, 68 W. Va. 506, 514, 70 S. E.
113 (1911); State v, Larue, 98 W. Va, 677, 690, 128 S. E. 116 (1925).
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The problem of the parties' own account book is different the necessity of its admission arose from the parties' disqualificatlon for interest, rather than from their unavailibility.' After
the bar of interest was removed,' where it was completely removed,
the hearsay problem was no longer significant, for the account
book was admissible as "past recollection recorded".!
But the statutory provision in West Virginia,' and in most
states,"' does not remove the bar as to a transaction with a person
deceased or insane. It is held, however, that this does not prevent the use of a shop book in such a case. The shop-keeper may
take the stand and vouch for the accuracy of the book; this is
"identifying" not "testifying".'
In spite of the liberal construction placed by the courts on
such legislation," there still remain many cases directly within
the exclusionary principle of the statute." Only legislative action
can relieve the situation. The legislature should repeal the "dead
man's" statute for it bars honest claims of the living more often
'See n. 1, supra.
7By general statutory enactment the disqualification of parties has 'been
removed. See 1 WIGM RE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1928 § 488 ff. Cf. W. VA. REV.
CODE (1931) c. 51, art. 3, § 1; Crothers v. Crothers, 40 W. Va. 169, 174, 20
S. E. 927 (1895); Anderson v. Snyder, 21 W. Va. 632, 643 (1883).
1For a discussion of the theory of "past recollections recorded", see, 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1927) § 745; and, in relation to this particular
exception, 2 WIGBroRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1559.

'See, W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 57, art. 3, § 1: "But this prohibition
shall not extend to any transaction or communication as to which any such
executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee,
survivor or committee shall be examined on his own behalf, nor as to which
the testimony of such'deceased person or lunatic shall be given in evidence."
10See n. 7, supra.
"See, 2 WIGSIORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 1530, 1561.
"See n.7, supra.
The West Virginia court, however, in Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. Va.
412, 462 (1886), said that it would construe the qualifying clause of the section "liberally with a view to suppress the evil which this exception to the
removal of the common law disabilities was designed to avoid" but it
fecognized that "the object of the section was to widen, not to narrow, the
competency of witnesses . .

. ."

Accord: Crothers v. Crothers, supra n. 7;

Gilmer v. Baker, 24 W. Va. 72, 84 (1884). Cf. Sayre v. Whetherhold, 88 W.
Va. 542, 107 S.E. 293 (1921); Brown v. Click, 59 W. Va. 172, 174, 53 S.
E. 16 (1906). And see, Board of Education v. Harvey, 70 W. Va. 480,
481, 74 S. E. 507 (1912), where a party to the suit was held competent to
testify in his own behalf against a board of education in relation to a personal transaction between himself and a deceased member of the board.
Cf. Smith v. Guaranty Co., 109 W. Va. 280, 286, 153 S. E. 584 (1930);
Stansbury v. Bright, 109 W. Va. 651, 156 S. E. 62 (1930). (The statute
does not apply to agents who testify on behalf of their principals against
decedent estates).
"For an example, see Gardner v, Gardner, 166 S.E. 112 (W. Va. 1932).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss2/9

2

Peters: Some Statutory Modifications of the Hearsay Rule
LEGISLATION
than it protects the estates of the dead.' Estates in jurisdictions
where such evidence is admissible have not been robbed by the
perjury of the living."
Should not West Virginia adopt a statute similar to that
recommended by the committee on reform of the law of evidence ?
The proposed statute reads as follows:
"No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any
action, suit or proceeding by reason of his interest in the
event of the same as a party or otherwise.
"In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of deceased persons, including proceedings for the
probate of wills, any statement of the deceased, whether oral
or written, shall not be excluded as hearsay provided that the
trial judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was
made by the decedent, and that it was made in good faith
and on decedent's personal knowledge.' " '
Likewise, all declarations of deceased persons should be receivable in evidence if in the opinion of the court they were made
in good faith before the commencement of the action and on the
personal knowledge of the deceased. Any skepticism concerning
the evidence should go to its weight and should not be a ground
for its exclusion. A statute of this character has been given a
thorough trial in Massachusetts.
There the court has liberally
construed the statute so as to enlarge rather than restrict its
benefits.' The statute has met with the general approval of the
Massachusetts bench and bar.'
14

n Owens v. Owens, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1879), the court said that the
disqualification "was intended to prevent an undue advantage on the part
of the living over the dead, who cannot confront the survivor, or give his
version of the affair, or expose the omission, mistakes or perhaps falsehoods
of such survivor. The temptation to falsehood and concealment in such cases
is considered too great, to allow the surviving party to testify in his own
behalf. Any other view of this subject ....
would place in great peril the
estates of the dead, and would in fact make them an easy prey for the dishonest and unscrupulous."
25 These fears have not been realized. I WoMUoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 578; Coleman, Suggested Lines of Activity for the West Virginia Bar
Association, (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 274, 276; Taft, Comments on Wil Contests in New York (1921) 39 YALE L. J. 593, 605.
Tnm LAw or EVIDENCE (1927 Yale University Press) 35.
27 MAss. GEN. L.&ws (1921) c. 233, § 65. "A declaration of a deceased
person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court finds
that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action and
upon the personal knowledge of the declarant."
" See Buckley v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 50, 55, 102 N. B. 75
(1913); Tenny v. Foss, 268 Mass. 69, 167 N. E. 280 (1929).
29 THE LAw o1 EVIDENCE, supra n. 16, at 40-49; Cf. Brown, The Massaohusetts Declarations of Deceased Persons Statute (1932) 12 B. U. L, 1REV, 396,
411-413.
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Statutes for the admission of evidence of persons deceased or
insane might be extended by analogy to the business entries rule
to the admission of all evidence of persons actually unavailable
in court. ' It is thought, however, that there is greater reason
for, and would be less opposition to the admission of the evidence
Consequently the adoption of the
of only those dead or insane.'
following uniform statute is urged:
"A declaration, whether written or oral, of a deceased or
insane person shall not be excluded from evidence as hearsay
if the court finds that it was made and that it was made in
good faith before the commencement of the action and upon
the personal knowledge of the declarant. ' '
The adoption of these proposals would make available much
relevant evidence; but it would give no advantage to any group
or interest - it would merely permit the jury to know that which
it must now only surmise. These provisions have been found
workable in other states. May West Virginia gain the same advantages.
-TRXY

M. PETERS.

SHOULD COMIVIENT BY THE TRIAL JUDGE BE
AUTHORIZED IN WEST VIRGINIA?
Whatever else familiarity may breed, with lawyers it has
bred opposition to all change in the customs and practices of their
profession. But some (and perhaps often, much) opposition to
change is inevitable in a profession founded on tradition. Thus
the return of the common law power of judicial comment has been
long delayed. Only a few leading lawyers' and jurists have sponsored its return.
2

0THE LAw or EVIDENCE, supra n.16, at 49.
aSo long as a witness is competent and living there is at least a possibility
of getting a deposition.
2
TnE LAw oF EVIDENCE, .supra n.16.

"Judge Ritz, in speaking of judicial comment said, "I think it is true
in this state, that we have a system that does not allow our judges in the
state courts to intelligently try a case," (1928) PRoc. W. VA. BA ASS'N
70. Judge McOlintic, at the same meeting said that in 1921 when he was
a member of the legislature, he introduced a bill permitting the circuit
judge to comment if'both parties agreed. Of the twenty-three lawyers in
the House of Delegafes, twenty-one opposed the bill. Three circuit judges
lobbied against it because, as they stated, it would make them pay too close
attention during the trial, (1928) PROc. W. VA. BAR Ass'N 162.
"'The . .. . rule (which obtains by Constitution or statute in almost
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